Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

Case Overview

CITATION

315 U.S. 568 (1942)

ARGUED ON

February 5, 1942

DECIDED ON

March 9, 1942

DECIDED BY

Legal Issue

Are “fighting words” entitled to constitutional protection under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?

Holding

No, “fighting words” do not fall within the scope of the First Amendment.

The Arrest of Walter Chaplinsky | Credit: Claremont Review

Background

In 1940, Walter Chaplinsky was on a public street in Rochester passing out flyers that called organized religion a “racket.” He eventually drew a crowd, which led police to remove him from the area. While walking with police, Chaplinsky saw the town marshal, who had previously warned him against causing a disturbance, and verbally attacked him by yelling that he was a “God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist.” Chaplinsky was arrested under New Hampshire's Offensive Conduct law, which stated that:

“No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.”

Chaplinsky argued that the statute was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment because it restricted his rights to freedom of speech, press, and religion. Nonetheless, he was found guilty and his conviction was upheld by the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

Summary

Unanimous decision for New Hampshire

Stone

Chaplinsky

Black

Roberts

Byrnes

Frankfurter

Reed

Murphy

Jackson

Douglas

New Hampshire

Opinion of the Court

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Frank Murphy upheld the Chaplinsky’s conviction under New Hampshire’s Offensive Conduct Law. Murphy determined that Chaplinsky had used “fighting words,” which are words that “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” This established the fighting words doctrine, which stipulates that “such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”

Murphy ruled that fighting words are not constitutionally protected and emphasized that the government has a compelling interest in maintaining peace and order in society. Certain forms of expression, like those which provoke violence or disrupt public tranquility, can be restricted. Murphy explained that the purpose of New Hampshire’s law was to preserve the public peace and that “the statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee. . .” He concluded, writing that “a statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not unduly to impair liberty of expression, is not too vague for a criminal law.”