Miller v. Texas
Case Overview
CITATION
153 U.S. 535 (1894)
SUBMITTED ON
April 23, 1894
DECIDED ON
May 14, 1894
DECIDED BY
McDonald v. Chicago (2010)
OVERRULED BY
Legal Issue
Does the Second Amendment prevent states from passing laws that prohibit an individual from carrying dangerous weapons?
Holding
No, the Second Amendment places limitations on the federal government, not state governments. States can enact legislation prohibiting individuals from carrying dangerous weapons so long as it does not offend their state constitution.
Photo in Dallas County, 1893, of Main Street looking west, toward a courthouse | Credit: Pamela Bosse, Photo by: Clifton Church
Background
In Texas, there was a law prohibiting the carrying of dangerous weapons on a person. In effect, the law meant that an individual walking on a public street with a pistol could be subject to criminal punishment.
On June 18, 1892, Franklin Miller was indicted by a grand jury in Dallas County, Texas, for the murder of a police officer with an illegally carried handgun. In July, Miller was convicted and sentenced to death. Miller appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, but they affirmed his conviction and sentence. He then filed a motion for rehearing, but that was denied. Miller subsequently filed a writ with the Supreme Court claiming that his Second Amendment protection of the right to keep and bear arms had been violated by Texas’ law against carrying dangerous weapons.
Summary
Unanimous Motion to Dismiss
Miller
Texas
Fuller
White
Jackson
Harlan
Field
Brown
Gray
Brewer
Shiras
Opinion of the Court
Writing for the Court, Justice Henry Billings Brown held that the Second Amendment’s protection of the right to keep and bear arms did not prevent the states from passing laws that restrict the carrying of dangerous weapons. He added, however, that since the Second Amendment is only relevant to the federal government, so “we [the Court] think there is no Federal question properly presented by the record in this case, and that the writ of error must be dismissed upon that ground.” In his brief explanation, he wrote, “We have examined the record in vain, however, to find where the defendant was denied the benefit of any of these provisions, and even if he were, it is well settled that the restrictions of these amendments operate only upon the Federal power, and have no reference whatever to proceedings in state courts.”
He concluded, “[a]s the proceedings were conducted under the ordinary forms of criminal prosecutions there certainly was no denial of due process of law, nor did the law of the State, to which reference was made, abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”