Plessy v. Ferguson
Case Overview
CITATION
ARGUED ON
DECIDED ON
163 U.S. 537 (1896)
April 13, 1896
May 18, 1896
DECIDED BY
Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
OVERRULED BY
Legal Issue
Do laws requiring private accommodations that are “separate but equal” between races violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Holding
No, the “separate but equal” doctrine does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A colored waiting room at a train station in Durham, North Carolina (May 1940) | Credit: Library of Congress
Background
In 1890, the State of Louisiana enacted the Separate Car Act, which required railway companies to provide “equal, but separate” accommodations for white and colored passengers. The law also required officers to assign passengers to the coach or compartment of their race and empowered them to impose fines or imprisonment on passengers who did not comply.
On June 7, 1892, Homer Plessy, a citizen of the United States and Louisiana, purchased a first-class ticket on the East Louisiana railway from New Orleans to Covington and sat in the white section of the train. Despite being 7/8 Caucasian and 1/8 African, Plessy was ordered by the conductor to move to the colored section of the train. When Plessy refused, he was forcibly ejected from the train by the police and imprisoned in the parish jail of New Orleans.
Plessy petitioned for his criminal case to be throw out, arguing that the Separate Car Act was unconstitutional under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The judge on his case, John H. Ferguson, ruled that the state had the right to regulate railroad companies within their jurisdiction and threw out his complaint. Plessy then appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court, which issued a temporary writ of prohibition to review his petition. In December of 1892, the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled to uphold the Separate Car Act and deny Plessy the relief requested. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari.
Summary
7 - 1 decision for Ferguson
Plessy
Ferguson
Shiras
Brown
Gray
Fuller
White
Brewer*
Field
Peckham
Harlan
* Justice Brewer took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Opinion of the Court
Writing for the Court, Justice Henry Brown argued that the Separate Car Act was not violative of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, since it did not impose a form of involuntary servitude. He stated, “[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races...has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races.”
Brown also upheld the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment, which guarantees equal protection under the law. He argued that the Amendment's purpose was to ensure political, not social, equality. According to Brown, laws that mandate racial segregation do not inherently imply the inferiority of one race over the other and are within the state’s police powers to enact. He dismissed the argument that segregation branded Black citizens with a “badge of inferiority”, writing “ [i]f this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”
The solution to prejudice, Brown argued, was not action by state legislatures. He wrote that “[i]f the two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals.” Brown ultimately concluded that the separation of races in public conveyances was a reasonable exercise of state power and did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, thus upholding the constitutionality of the Separate Car Act.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Harlan
In his solo dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan argued strongly against the majority’s decision upholding the Separate Car Act. Harlan asserted that railroads act as public highways and exercise public functions, meaning that state legislatures can’t regulate their use based solely on race. He wrote that “[i]n respect of civil rights, common to all citizens, the Constitution of the United States does not, I think, permit any public authority to know the race of those entitled to be protected in the enjoyment of such rights. Every true man has pride of race, and under appropriate circumstances when the rights of others, his equals before the law, are not to be affected, it is his privilege to express such pride and to take such action based upon it as to him seems proper. But I deny that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have regard to the race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens are involved.”
Harlan found that the intent of the Separate Car Act was obviously to harm Black Americans, arguing that “[e]very one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white persons.” The result of the Court’s decision to uphold the law was the infringement of personal liberty for millions of Americans. Harlan wrote, “If a white man and a black man choose to occupy the same public conveyance on a public highway, it is their right to do so, and no government, proceeding alone on grounds of race, can prevent it without infringing the personal liberty of each.”
In the view of the Thirteenth Amendment, Harlan found that “[t]he arbitrary separation of citizens, on the basis of race, while they are on a public highway, is a badge of servitude wholly inconsistent with the civil freedom and the equality before the law established by the Constitution. It cannot be justified upon any legal grounds.” He argued that such a system of laws went against America’s promise of freedom.
Harlan concluded warning that “[i]f evils will result from the commingling of the two races upon public highways established for the benefit of all, they will be infinitely less than those that will surely come from state legislation regulating the enjoyment of civil rights upon the basis of race. We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before the law. The thin disguise of “equal” accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead anyone, nor atone for the wrong this day done.”
“But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man, and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.”
Justice John Marshall Harlan