Writing for the Court, Justice George Sutherland held that while the text of the Sixth Amendment states that defendants have a right to counsel in federal criminal trials, the right was extended to the states as a fundamental part of citizens’ due process rights. Sutherland explained that the right to counsel is “so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel [is] likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” He also acknowledged the complexity that often accompanies legal proceedings, writing that “[t]he right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.”

Sutherland elaborated on the specific circumstances of the Scottsboro Boys’ case. He pointed out that the Scottsboro Boys were given a hastily arranged and executed trial where no true opportunity for defense was given. He also emphasized the environment of racial hostility that influenced the trials, writing “[i]t is perfectly apparent that the proceedings, from beginning to end, took place in an atmosphere of tense, hostile and excited public sentiment.” He underscored that the combination of the defendants’ youth, their illiteracy, the complexity of the situation, and the overwhelming public sentiment against them created a scenario where they were uniquely vulnerable to a miscarriage of justice. He stressed that under such conditions, it was the state’s duty to ensure that the trial was conducted with the solemnity and care needed for the assurance of a fair trial. Sutherland stated that “[u]nder the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense. To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities.”

While Sutherland concluded that the Scottsboro Boys had been denied due process as guaranteed to them by the Fourteenth Amendment, he limited the impact of his decision to the facts of their case. He explained, “[w]hether this would be so in other criminal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law.”