Strickland v. Washington
Case Overview
CITATION
466 U.S. 668 (1984)
ARGUED ON
January 10, 1984
DECIDED ON
May 14, 1984
DECIDED BY
Legal Issue
What is the appropriate standard to determine whether a convicted person's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated?
Holding
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficient performance was so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Newspaper from Tuesday, December 7, 1976, reporting on Washington’s sentence | Credit: Newspapers by Ancestry
Background
In September of 1976, David Leroy Washington committed several crimes, including three brutal stabbing murders, torture, kidnapping, severe assaults, attempted murder, attempted extortion, and theft. After his two accomplices were arrested, Washington surrendered himself to the police and voluntarily confessed to some of the crimes. Washington was subsequently indicted for kidnapping and murder, and the state appointed an experienced criminal lawyer to represent him.
Against the advice of counsel, Washington plead guilty in a Florida state court to the charges, which carried potential death penalties under Florida law. Also against the advice of counsel, Washington waived his right under Florida law to an advisory jury at his capital sentencing hearing, choosing instead to be sentenced by the trial judge without a jury recommendation. At the sentencing hearing, Washington’s counsel did not present any witnesses, but he did successfully move to exclude Washington’s ‘rap sheet’ from being entered into evidence. Washington was ultimately sentenced to death by the trial judge for the three murders.
Following the imposition of the death sentence, Washington appealed, claiming that his counsel's ineffective assistance had violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. He argued that his attorney failed to make a reasonable investigation into potential mitigating factors or present such evidence during the sentencing phase, thereby prejudicing the outcome of his case. Additionally, Washington argued that his attorney did not seek out character and psychological evidence that might have persuaded the court to opt for a lesser sentence than death.
Washington’s appeal was unsuccessful in the Florida state courts, which held that the attorney’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the alleged deficient performance did not affect the outcome of the sentencing. With further appeals to higher courts also failing, Washington petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari.
Summary
8 - 1 decision for Washington
Strickland
Washington
Blackmun
White
Brennan
O’Connor
Rehnquist
Burger
Powell
Marshall
Stevens
Opinion of the Court
Writing for the Court, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor explained that for a defendant to successfully claim ineffective assistance of counsel, two components must be proven. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, meaning that the errors made were so serious that counsel was not functioning as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must demonstrate that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, meaning that counsel’s errors were so severe they deprived the defendant of a fair trial, making the trial’s result unreliable.
O’Connor emphasized that the proper standard for attorney performance is “reasonably effective assistance” in consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the trial. She argued that judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and a court must eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time. O’Connor explained that a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, writing that “the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” She further opined that “[t]he object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance,” and that “[c]ourts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal justice system suffers as a result.”
Regarding the required showing of prejudice, O’Connor stated that the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. She wrote, “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” This standard is not outcome-determinative but rather aims to ensure that the proceeding’s result is reliable and just. O’Connor clarified that these standards do not establish mechanical rules but focus on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. The ultimate focus of inquiry must be on whether the adversarial process was undermined, producing an unjust result.
Opinion by Justice Brennan
In his opinion, Justice William Brennan joined the Court’s opinion but dissented from its judgement. Brennan explained that since, in his view, the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, he would vacate Washington’s death sentence and remand the case for further proceedings.
Regarding the issue of effective counsel, Brennan explained his belief that “the standards [the Court] sets out today will both provide helpful guidance to courts considering claims of actual ineffectiveness of counsel and also permit those courts to continue their efforts to achieve progressive development of this area of the law.” He further explained that the standards are “sufficiently precise to permit meaningful distinctions between those attorney derelictions that deprive defendants of their constitutional rights and those that do not; at the same time, the standards are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the wide variety of situations giving rise to claims of this kind.” Brennan also agreed with the Court that a specific set of detailed rules for the conduct of counsel would be inappropriate.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Marshall
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall criticized the majority for setting an excessively lenient standard for determining ineffective assistance of counsel. Marshall argued that the majority’s requirement for defendants to show both deficient performance and prejudice undermines the fundamental right to a fair trial. He contended that any significant deficiency in counsel's performance should be sufficient to warrant relief, emphasizing that the right to counsel means the right to competent counsel.
Marshall argued that the majority’s decision ignored the realities of how ineffective assistance impacts the adversarial process. He asserted that the requirement to prove prejudice places an undue burden on defendants and fails to account for the cumulative effect of multiple deficiencies. He wrote, “[t]he requirement that a defendant show prejudice as well as incompetence has no basis in law and is simply unsupportable.” Marshall also emphasized the importance of ensuring that legal representation meets a standard of competence that safeguards the fairness of the trial and expressed concern that the majority’s ruling would allow many convictions to stand despite significant lawyer errors that undermine the reliability of the trial outcome. He pointed out that the decision “turns a deaf ear to the reality that the adversary system cannot function properly unless defense counsel has done their work properly.”.
Marshall concluded by underscoring the essential role of effective counsel in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process and protecting the rights of defendants. He argued that the Court’s decision diluted the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee and compromised the fundamental fairness that is the cornerstone of the criminal justice system.