Brown v. Entertainment Merchants
Case Overview
CITATION
564 U.S. 786 (2011)
ARGUED ON
November 2, 2010
DECIDED ON
June 27, 2011
DECIDED BY
Legal Issue
Does a state law restricting the sale of violent video games to minors violate the First Amendment?
Holding
Yes, a state law restricting the sale of violent video games to minors violates the First Amendment.
The bill’s sponsor, California State Senator Leland Yee displaying violent video games | Credit: AP Photo/Paul Sakuma
Background
In 2005, the California State Legislature passed AB 1179, a bill that prohibited the sale of violent video games to anyone under the age of 18, punishable by a fine of up to $1,000. The definition of “violent video game” used in the bill used a variation of the Miller test. The bill stated that a video game would be considered violent if it included the “killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being,” and if the following also applied:
A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find [the game] appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors.
It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is suitable for minors.
It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the bill into law in October 2005. In response, the Entertainment Software Association (ESA) and the Entertainment Merchants Association (EMA) filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. In December 2005, the judge granted a preliminary injunction to block enforcement of the law while the case proceeded. In 2007, the judge ruled in favor of the ESA and EMA, and the decision was upheld two years later by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Summary
7 - 2 decision for Entertainment Merchants
Entertainment Merchants
Brown
Sotomayor
Ginsburg
Thomas
Alito
Breyer
Kagan
Roberts
Kennedy
Scalia
Opinion of the Court by Justice Scalia
Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia held that California’s law prohibiting the sale of violent video games to minors violated the First Amendment. Scalia noted that while it is difficult to distinguish politics and entertainment, video games are a protected form of speech because “like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices […] and through features distinctive to the medium.” The state argued that the interactive element of video games set them apart from other forms of speech, but Scalia pointed out the long history of choose-your-own-adventure stories to show that “all literature is interactive.”
California’s law used a variant of the Miller test, which was originally established to judge obscenity. While obscene speech, which has a long history of regulation and may be proscribed, may be regulated, Scalia asserted that the obscenity exemption to the First Amendment does not cover whatever a legislature finds shocking, only depictions of sexual conduct. He reaffirmed that content restrictions are offensive to free speech and cited the Court’s decision in Stevens v. United States (2010) in which they held that new categories of unprotected speech cannot be added to the list by a legislature simply because they determined the speech to be too harmful. Scalia explained that “without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise the ‘judgment [of] the American people,’ embodied in the First Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.’”
Scalia argued that California would have the justification for this law if history reflected a tradition of restricting the access of children to violent content, but it does not. Scalia did however note that traditional fairy tales such as Hansel & Gretel and Cinderella contain content similar to that which California’s bill appears to be against. He wrote that such stories have “no shortage of gore” but have long been accepted by the community as appropriate for children. Scalia explained the disparity, writing, “California has singled out the purveyors of video games for disfavored treatment—at least when compared to booksellers, cartoonists, and movie producers—and has given no persuasive reason why.”
While Scalia acknowledged the government’s legitimate authority to protect children from harm, he stated that they are still entitled to First Amendment protection. He wrote that in narrow and well-defined circumstances, the government has the power to prohibit certain protected materials from being distributed to kids, but “that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.” Just because a legislature determines speech to be “unsuitable” for children does not mean they have the constitutional authority to ban their access to it. The legislature must have a narrowly-tailored and substantial interest in order to override the First Amendment protection of speech. Finding neither, Scalia held that California’s law banning the sale of video games to minors was unconstitutional.
Concurring Opinion by Justice Alito
Joined by Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Samuel Alito argued that while he agreed the Court that California’s law was unconstitutional, he felt that they should not “squelch legislative efforts to deal with what is perceived by some to be a significant and developing social problem.” While he agreed that the statute was too broad to provide the fair notice required by the Constitution, Alito believed that the Court went too far in applying First Amendment scrutiny in this case. He argued that they should have instead used the more lenient standard applied in Ginsberg v. New York (1965).
Alito also disagreed with the Court’s holding that the increasingly interactive nature of video games has no effect on the reception of their content. Alito referenced technologies such as virtual reality, which allow the player to become completely immersed in a fantasy world in ways never imagined before. He recognized their potential danger, writing “[i]f the technological characteristics of the sophisticated games that are likely to be available in the near future are combined with the characteristics of the most violent games already marketed, the result will be games that allow troubled teens to experience in an extraordinarily personal and vivid way what it would be like to carry out unspeakable acts of violence.” Alito ultimately concluded with a much smaller scope than the majority’s opinion, holding only that the particular law at issue here failed to provide the clear notice that the Constitution requires.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Thomas
In his dissenting opinion in, Justice Clarence Thomas asserted his belief that “the practices and beliefs held by the Founders reveal another category of excluded speech: speech to minor children bypassing their parents.” From an originalist perspective, Thomas explained that the founding generation had a strong belief in parental authority and that they would have never construed the First Amendment to protect the right of minor children to access material deemed obscene by an elected legislature. He pointed out that historically, certain categories of speech were not deemed appropriate for children and there is a long history of prohibiting them from profane books and songs. He ultimately concluded that “[t]he freedom of speech, as originally understood, does not include a right to speak to minors without going through the minors’ parents or guardians. Therefore, I cannot agree that the statute at issue is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.”
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Breyer
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Steven Breyer argued that the law “impose[d] no more than a modest restriction on expression” in order to achieve the compelling government of protecting children from violent content. He pointed out out that the burden imposed by this law meant that in order for a child to access a violent video game, an adult would have to buy it for them. Breyer noted the disparity between the Court’s opinion in this case and its ruling in Ginsberg, writing “But what sense does it make to forbid selling to a 13-year-old boy a magazine with an image of a nude woman, while protecting a sale to that 13-year-old of an interactive video game in which he actively, but virtually, binds and gags the woman, then tortures and kills her. This anomaly is not compelled by the First Amendment. It disappears once one recognizes that extreme violence, where interactive, and without literary, artistic, or similar justification, can prove at least as, if not more, harmful to children as photographs of nudity.”