Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan held that Texas’ desecration statute was unconstitutional. Brennan reasoned that the First Amendment offers extensive protections, writing that it “literally forbids the abridgment only of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written word.” The First Amendment protects not only spoken or written speech, but expressive conduct as well. Displaying the history of symbolic speech in the Court, Brennan cited the decisions in Stromberg v. California, in which flags were recognized as vessels for speech, and Tinker v. Des Moines, in which black armbands were recognized as a form of speech. In order for the government to limit expressive conduct, Brennan held that the government’s interest must be examined to determine whether or not restrictions on a form of expression are valid.

Texas argued that their desecration statute was important because it served two important government interests: preventing breaches of the peace and protecting a venerated national symbol. In response to these arguments, Brennan found that the first argument did not apply, since no breach of peace occurred as a result of Johnson’s conduct. Referencing the Court’s decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio, Brennan noted that the government can only take action against speech that is likely to cause “imminent lawless action.”

As for the argument that the state had an interest in protecting the flag as a national symbol, Brennan referenced the courts decision in Spence v. Washington, in which the Court held that the First Amendment is invoked when there is an intent to convey a particular message and if there’s a great likelihood that the message would be understood by those who see it. Applying this standard to Johnson’s case, Brennan argued that the political nature of Johnson’s expression was “intentional and overwhelmingly apparent,” considering it was done in response to the Republican National Convention and the Reagan administration during an election year. Ultimately, he reasoned that Johnson’s political expression was restricted because of what he was saying and not how it was said, meaning that “[t]he Texas law is thus not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of the flag in all circumstances, but is designed instead to protect it only against impairments that would cause serious offense to others.” Brennan concluded that “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive.”